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Abstract
In this paper, we define the concept of software security
hardening, which will allow the developers and maintainers
to deploy and harden security features and remedy present
vulnerabilities and threats into existing open source soft-
ware. We also propose a classification of the different levels
at which the hardening can be applied and a methodology
for hardening of high level security into applications based
on a well-defined security ontology. In addition to this con-
tribution, we elaborate the methods for hardening security
vulnerabilities found in C according to the classification we
propose.
1. Motivations & Background
In todays computing world, security takes an increas-
ingly predominant role. The industry is facing challenges
in public confidence at the discovery of vulnerabilities, and
customers are expecting security to be delivered out of the
box, even on programs that were not designed with secu-
rity in mind. Software maintainers must face the challenge,
today, to improve the security of their programs, and are
often under-equipped to do so. Some countries are taking
advantage of open source software for their production sys-
tems as the availability of the source code facilitates their
validation and answers their need for trustworthy programs.
Open source software are typically implemented using the
C programming language 1 and, as such, it is necessary to
investigate the security issues related to C.
This paper provides the first academic attempt at secu-
rity hardening, and demonstrates its applicability on the C
language. We refer to the process of integrating security
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1according to SourceForge.net statistics, 26.22% of open source
projects at “Production” and “Mature” levels are written in C [7]
into existing software as security hardening, as this practice
often refers to modifying the program in a way that makes
it more resistant against attacks. In the current context, it
becomes increasingly important to provide tools to main-
tainers that will facilitate and accelerate the security hard-
ening process, increasing the effectiveness of the effort and
lowering the resources required to do so.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section
2, we introduce the important contributions on the field of
secure programming. Afterwards, in section 3, we define
security hardening and propose a classification of its differ-
ent levels. In section 4, we present a methodology for high
level security hardening based on a well-defined security
ontology. In section 5, we elaborate the methods of harden-
ing against vulnerabilities related to C programs, structured
according to our classification. Finally, we offer concluding
remarks in section 6.
2. Related work
The topic of hardening is mostly known at the level of the
operating system and network configuration (i.e. Bastille
Linux [1]). Our approach constitutes an organized frame-
work for methodologies for the improvement of security at
all levels of the system. As such, the terminology of “hard-
ening” that we propose is not the same as for operating sys-
tem hardening. Currently, security solutions can be found
in secure coding books, in programmer/reviewer checklists,
and in the mind of many experts. This help does not offer
practical support on how to deal with legacy code and how
to harden security into existing software.
On the topic of secure programming of C programs, de-
velopers are offered a good selection of useful and highly
relevant material. One of the newest and most useful addi-
tions is from [9], which offers in-depth explanations on the
nature of all known low-level security vulnerabilities in C
and C++. Its treatment of integer overflows is the best we
found in the literature.
Another common reference is from Microsoft [5], and
includes all the basic security problems and solutions, as
well as code fragments of functions allowing to safely im-
plement certain operations (such as safe memory wiping).
The authors also describe high-level security issues, threat
modeling, access control, etc.
Slides from Bishop(such as [3]) provide a comprehen-
sive view on information assurance, as well as security vul-
nerabilities in C. He is one of the few who cover in depth
environmental issues, used in some advanced exploits. In
addition, he provides some hints and practices to solve some
existing security issues.
In the literature, the reference that is the closest in com-
prehensibility to our work comes from Wheeler [10]. In
the material he published online, he covers operating sys-
tem security, safe temporary files, cryptography, multiple
operating platforms, spam, etc.
3. Security Hardening
Security hardening is an informally known term right
now and, as such, we first provide a definition for it. We also
propose a taxonomy of security hardening methods that re-
fer to area to which the solution is applied. We established
our taxonomy by studying the solutions of software secu-
rity problems in the literature. Even though our reading in-
cluded a significant biais towards C [3, 9, 5, 10], we believe
that our taxonomy is language independent. We also inves-
tigated the security engineering of applications at different
levels, including specification and design issues [4, 5].
We define software security hardening as any process,
methodology, product or combination thereof that is used
to directly increase the security of existing software. In this
context, the following constitutes the detailed classification
of security hardening methods:
Code-Level Hardening are changes in the source code in
a way that prevents vulnerabilities without altering the de-
sign. Some vulnerabilities are a direct result of the pro-
gramming activities. Code level hardening constitutes of
removing these vulnerabilities in a systematic way.
Software Process Hardening is replacement of the devel-
opment tools and compilers, the use of stronger implemen-
tation of libraries and the use of code weaving tools in a
way that does not change the original code yet results in in-
creased security.
Design-Level Hardening consists of the reengineering of
the application in order to integrate security features that
were absent or insufficient. Some security vulnerabilities
cannot be resolved by a simple change in the code or by a
better environment, but are due to a fundamentally flawed
design. This category of hardening practices target more
high-level security such as access control, authentication
and secure communication. In this context, best practices
and security design patterns [4], can be redirected from their
original intent and used to guide the redesign effort.
Operating Environment Hardening stands for improve-
ments to the security of the execution context (network, op-
erating systems, libraries, etc.) that is relied upon by the
software. Those changes make exploitation of vulnerabil-
ities typically harder, although they do not remedy them.
[1, 10].
4. Hardening for High Level Security
This section illustrates our proposition and methods to
harden high level security into applications. At that level,
deploying such type of security is mainly categorized as
design-level hardening. For this reason, some methods
of security design and application re-engineering will be
needed to achieve our goal. Our approach for hardening of
high level security uses security ontology to enable the auto-
mated processing of security related information. Ontology
is the specification of a conceptualization of a knowledge
domain. Security ontology provides definition of security
concepts and relations between them. These are required as
many different definitions are used in security literature, so
a clarification of the relations between the concepts help to
get a better understanding of the overall security concept.
The security ontology used in this paper is part of a com-
plete one presented in [8]. We chose this ontology because
it describes a generic model of security applied in all the
domains. As such, these definitions can be modified to fit
in other specific application domains. Figure 1 illustrates
those concepts and shows the relationships among them.
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Figure 1. Security Ontology Architecture
The following is a brief description of this security on-
tology’s components and their relationships:
Assets are information or resources which have value to an
organization or person. Applications, systems and networks
are counted as assets. The weak assets are those that have
vulnerabilities.
Vulnerabilities are flaws or weaknesses in an asset. Attack-
ers exploit vulnerabilities to break the security of an asset.
Risks are the probabilities that an attack to an asset suc-
ceeds. Threats increase the risk for security breach, while
countermeasures reduce it.
Security Objectives are statement of intents to counter and
address threats and satisfy the identified security needs. The
state of security is achieved when the protection against
threats is guaranteed.
Threats are exploitable vulnerabilities. Threats cause harm
to assets and increase the risk of security breach.
Countermeasures are mitigation techniques performed in
order to protect an asset against threats and attacks. Coun-
termeasures reduce the risk of security breach.
Expressing the security concept in such an ontological
way permit us to better identify and order the steps needed
to harden security into applications. This ontology can be
converted into a process, where each entity dependent on
another becomes an analysis step dependent on the results
of the previous related step(s). Although security hardening
focuses on finding the best countermeasure to a particular
threat, we have no choice to perform some prerequisite tasks
in order to achieve a complete hardening process. In this
context, we present in the following subsections the steps
needed to harden security into applications.
4.1. Identifying Threats and Calculating
Risks
Identifying threats is an important task in security hard-
ening since we need to determine which treats require mit-
igation and how to mitigate them, preferably by applying
a structured and formal mechanism or process. As such,
the following is a brief description of the three main steps
needed to identify and evaluate the risk of a threat:
Application Decomposition is dividing the application into
its key components to identify the trust boundaries between
them. This decomposition help to minimize the number of
threats that need mitigation by excluding those that are out-
side the scope and beyond the control of the application.
Threat Identification is mainly categorizing it with respect
to the six know categories presented in [5]: Spoofing iden-
tity, tampering with data, repudiation, information disclo-
sure, denial of service and elevation of privilege.
Risk Evaluation is needed to determine the priority of
threats to be mitigated.
4.2. Countermeasures
Once the previous steps are done and the threat is well
identified and categorized, it is possible to determine the
appropriate technique(s) to mitigate it. In the literature, it
is possible to find mapping between categories of threats
and known counter-measures addressing them. Choosing
the best techniques will be mostly based on the state of the
art of weaknesses and mitigation methods as well as secu-
rity patterns. In [5], the authors provide a list of mitiga-
tion techniques for each category of threats of their classi-
fication. For example, against the threat of Spoofing Iden-
tity, they recommend to use appropriate authentication and
to protect secret data; against Information Disclosure, they
recommend to use authorization, encryption and to protect
secrets, etc. Regarding the deployment of these techniques
into applications and systems, security patterns are a use-
ful to choose the best techniques available, and guide their
implementation.
5. Hardening of Low Level Security
As a starting point, we discuss in this section the major
safety vulnerabilities of C programming that are introduced
in the source code during the implementation. In each of
the following subsections, we describe briefly each vulner-
ability as well as the hardening techniques used to remedy
them.
5.1. Hardening for Buffer Overflow Vulner-
abilities
Buffer Overflows (BoF) exploit common programming
errors that arise mostly from weak or non-existent bounds
checking of input being stored in memory buffers. Buffers
on both the stack and the heap can be corrupted [5]. Many
APIs and tools have been deployed to solve the problem
of Buffer Overflow or to make its exploitation harder [2,
6]. More methods for secure coding can be found in [5, 3].
In this context, Table 1 summarizes the security hardening
solutions for buffer overflows.
Hardening Level Product/Method
Code Bound-checking, memory manipula-
tion functions with length parameter,
null-termination, ensuring proper loop
bounds, format string specification, in-
put validation
Software Process Compile with canary words, inject
bound-checking aspects
Design Input validation, input sanitization
Operating
Environment
Disable stack execution, use libsafe,
enable stack randomization
Table 1. Hardening for Buffer Overflows
5.2. Hardening for Integer Vulnerabilities
Integer security issues are caused by converting between
signed and unsigned, signedness errors, truncation errors
and overflow and underflow [9]. Those vulnerabilities can
be solved using sound coding practices and special features
in some compilers (i.e. replace integer operations with safer
calls)[9]. The security hardening solutions for such prob-
lems are summarized in Table 2.
Hardening Level Product/Method
Code Use of functions detecting integer
overflow/underflow, migration to un-
signed integers, ensuring integer data
size in assignments/casts
Software Process Compiler option to convert arithmetic
operation to error condition-detecting
functions
Table 2. Hardening for Integer Vulnerabilities
5.3. Hardening for Memory Management
Vulnerabilities
The C programmer is in charge of pointer manage-
ment, buffer dimensions, allocation and deallocation of dy-
namic memory space, which may cause memory corrup-
tion, unauthorized access to memory space, buffer overflow,
etc [9]. Security hardening solutions against such problems
are summarized in Table 3.
Hardening Level Product/Method
Code NULL assignment on freeing and ini-
tialization, error handling on alloca-
tion, pointer initialization, avoid null
dereferencing
Software Process Using aspects to inject error handling
and assignments, compiler option to
force detection of multiple-free errors
Operating
Environment
Use a hardened memory manager (e.g.
dmalloc, phkmalloc)
Table 3. Hardening for Memory Management
Vulnerabilities
5.4. Hardening for File Management Vul-
nerabilities
File management errors can lead to the many security
vulnerabilities such as data disclosure, data corruption, code
injection and denial of service. Unsafe temporary file and
improper file creation access control flags are two major
sources of vulnerabilities in file management [10]. In some
cases, we can redesign the application to use inter-process
communication instead of temporary files. The security
hardening solutions for such problems are summarized in
Table 4.
Hardening Level Product/Method
Code Use proper temporary file functions,
default use of restrictive file permis-
sions, setting a restrictive file creation
mask, use of ISO/IEC TR 24731 func-
tions
Software Process Set a wrapper program changing file
creation mask
Design Redesign to avoid temporary files
Operating
Environment
Restricting access rights to relevant di-
rectories
Table 4. Hardening for File Management Vul-
nerabilities
6. Conclusion
We defined in this paper the concept of software security
hardening and a classification for hardening methods. Our
proposition will guide the developers and maintainers to de-
ploy and harden security features and remedy present vul-
nerabilities into existing open source software. Moreover,
we summarized the common vulnerabilities found in the C
language and their solutions using our framework, demon-
strating its usability. This paper constitutes the first task of
a complete security hardening framework.
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